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Abstract 
The development of the More-Electric Engine (MEE) concept 
will see an expansion in the power levels, functionality and 
criticality of electrical systems within engines. However, to 
date, these more critical electrical systems have not been 
accounted for in existing engine certification standards. To 
begin to address this gap, this paper conducts a review of 
current engine certification standards in order to determine 
how these standards will impact on the design requirements of 
More-Electric Engine (MEE) electrical system architectures. 
The paper focuses on determining two key architectural 
requirements: the number of individual failures an architecture 
can accommodate and still remain functional and the rate at 
which these failures are allowed to occur. The paper concludes 
by discussing how the derived failure rates begin to define a  
set of design requirements for MEE electrical architectures, 
considering various operating strategies, and demonstrates 
their application to example MEE electrical system architecture 
designs.  
Introduction 
The development of the More-Electric Engine (MEE) is 
potentially one of the next key steps in the greater 
electrification of aircraft systems [1, 2, 3]. The MEE concept 
focuses on the replacement of mechanically driven engine 
accessories such as fuel pumps and oil pumps with electrical 
equivalent systems, with possible benefits including reduction 
in overall system weight and size, and improved efficiency and 
maintainability [1, 2]. Clearly these design aspects are of high 
importance given the targets for increased fuel efficiency 
improvement for future generations of aircraft [4, 5] and 
reduction in aircraft maintenance requirements [4, 6] (including 
a desire for no unscheduled maintenance of aircraft by around 
2020 [6]). 
The inclusion of these electrical accessories will mean that the 
engine electrical power is likely to become more extensive than 
before, both in terms of cabling paths and power levels. The 
types of electrical devices which could be used within a MEE 
system are illustrated within Figure 1. These will also be far  
 
Figure 1. Example More-Electric Engine system with hardware from 
the ESVR demonstrator [3] 
PRUHFULWLFDOWRWKHHQJLQH¶VFRQWLQXHGRSHUDWLRQ+RZHYHUWKLV
increasing degree of importance for electrical systems has 
yetto be accounted for in existing engine certification standards 
which, with the exception of providing requirements for 
electrical engine control systems (EECS) design, do not 
explicitly cover electrical engine accessories. Therefore, there 
is a timely requirement to consider the certification 
requirements of MEE systems. 
This paper will consider the MEE from the perspective of its 
electrical system architecture design. Two of the key 
requirements for the design of a certifiable architecture relate 
to reliability and redundancy, namely the number of individual 
failures an architecture can accommodate and still remain 
functional and the rate at which these failures are allowed to 
occur. In order to define these design criteria for MEE electrical 
architectures, the paper conducts an in depth review of 
relevant engine certification standards, such as CS-E [7]. From 
this, the paper identifies where clear guidance is given within 
current standards, and also where they must be further 
developed to provide adequate coverage on MEE accessories. 
Where these gaps currently exist, the paper infers design 
requirements from existing functional descriptions contained 
within the standards in order to propose necessary design 
requirements.  
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The paper concludes by proposing a comprehensive set of 
design requirements for MEE electrical architectures for 
various operating strategies. The value of these requirements 
to future design programs is then demonstrated through their 
application to the feasibility evaluation of example MEE 
electrical system architecture designs. 
Review of engine certification standards 
and reliability requirements 
In order to properly quantify the certification requirements for 
new electrical loads it is important to understand the context of 
existing standards and their high level functional requirements. 
The following sections will therefore review the key certification 
standards for engine systems. The European Aviation Safety 
Agency¶V ($6$Certification Specifications for Engines (CS-
E) [7] and large aeroplanes (CS-25) [8] are used as the main 
point of reference within these sections however note that 
similar certification regulations do exist from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), with FAR part 25 [9] referring to 
transport category airplane and FAR part 33 [10] detailing the 
FAA regulations for aircraft engines. The sections define 
acceptable failure rates for various µengine effects¶ before 
consideration is given to which of these main failures may be 
influenced by the engine electrical system. This enables the 
derivation of design requirements for the various electrical 
components within this system as will be illustrated. 
Engine Failure Types and Acceptable Failure 
Rates 
Information from the standards related to the classification of 
different failure types and the maximum acceptable rate at 
which these are allowed to occur is presented in the following 
subsections.  
Acceptable Maximum Failure Rates 
Table 1 describes the acceptable maximum probability of 
occurrence for various failure classifications. Failures are 
classified based on their severity and likely impact on the 
aircraft. Clearly the aircraft should be designed in such a way 
so the failures of increasing severity occur less frequently.  
Note that the reliability specifications within AMC 25.1309 [8] 
define an additional category. This is: 
Extremely Improbable Failure Conditions: Extremely 
Improbable Failure Conditions are those so unlikely that they 
are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of 
all aeroplanes of one type, and have a probability of the order 
of 1 x 10±9 or less. Faults classLILHG DV µ&DWDVWURSKLF )DLOXUH
&RQGLWLRQV¶ ZKHUH ORVVRIKXOO DQGRUPXOWLSOH IDWDOLWLHVZRXOG
be expected if the fault were to occur [8]) must be shown to 
meet this target.  
For MEE applications, the reliability of the electrical 
accessories and supporting electrical architecture is shaped by 
these general targets as described in later sections. 
 
Table 1. Summary of CS-E failure rate specifications [7] 
General 
failure type 
classification 
Probability 
(average 
failures per 
flight hour) 
General description Engine 
specific 
terminology 
 
Extremely 
remote 
 
 
10-7 to 10-9 
Unlikely to occur when 
considering the total 
operational life of a 
number of aircraft of the 
type in which the Engine 
is installed, but 
nevertheless, has to be 
regarded as being 
possible. 
 
Hazardous 
Engine 
Effects 
 
Remote 
 
 
10-5 to 10-7 
Unlikely to occur to each 
aircraft during its total 
operational life but may 
occur several times when 
considering the total 
operational life of a 
number of aircraft of the 
type in which the Engine 
may be installed. 
 
Major Engine 
Effects  
 
Reasonably 
Probable 
 
 
10-3 to 10-5 
 
Unlikely to occur often 
during the operation of 
each aircraft of the type 
but which may occur 
several times during the 
total operational life of 
each aircraft of the types 
in which the Engine may 
be installed. 
 
Minor Engine 
Effects 
 
([DPSOHVRIYDULRXVµ(QJLQH(IIHFWV¶ 
The following sections provide examples of the types of 
defined within AMC-E 510 [7] DV µ+D]DUGRXV¶ µ0DMRU¶ DQG
µ0LQRU¶ :KLOVW WKHVH DUH SULPDULO\ GHVLJQHG WR UHJXODWH WKH
performance of non-electrical engine system, various entries 
may still be relevant to MEE accessories and architectures. For 
H[DPSOH WKH µQRQ-containment of high-HQHUJ\ GHEULV¶ LV
appropriate for electrical machines, particularly any high-speed 
designs that may be considered.  
Hazardous Engine Effects 
Hazardous engine effects include: 
1. Non-containment of high-energy debris 
2. Generation and delivery of toxic products caused by 
abnormal engine operation sufficient to incapacitate the 
crew or passengers during the flight. 
3. Significant thrust in the opposite direction to that 
commanded by the pilot.  
4. Uncontrolled fire. 
5. Complete inability to shut the engine down. 
Page 3 of 11 
 
Major Engine Effects 
Major engine effects include: 
1. Controlled fires (i.e., those brought under control through 
engine shutdown or onboard extinguishing systems). 
2. Case burn-through where there is no propagation to 
Hazardous Engine Effects. 
3. Release of low-energy parts where there is no propagation 
to Hazardous Engine Effects. 
4. Thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the 
pilot (below the level defined as hazardous). 
5. Generation of thrust greater than maximum rated thrust. 
6. Significant uncontrollable thrust oscillation. 
Minor Engine Effects 
A minor engine effect is an engine failure which only results in 
a partial or complete loss of thrust and associated secondary 
engine services. As these failures are expected to occur in 
service, the aircraft should be capable of controlled flight 
following an event of this nature. 
Failure conditions and operating strategies 
influenced by the electrical architecture design 
Based on the above review of failure types, two general design 
aspects have been identified which drive the reliability 
requirements of an engine system. These can be broadly 
categorised as: 
x The reliability of the engine itself and the components it 
contains (physical failures) 
x The UHOLDELOLW\RIFRQWUROV\VWHPVZLWKLQWKHHQJLQHµcontrol 
failures which lead to unwanted physical effects¶ 
The following sections will identify and describe two key failure 
cases which are influenced by the MEE electrical system 
architecture design. In each case, two important pieces of 
information are sought after from an architectural perspective. 
These are: 
x What is the maximum allowed rate of occurrence for the 
given failure condition? 
x How many redundant electrical supply paths are required 
to loads/supply points to prevent this failure occurring? 
The following review will be carried out with these questions in 
mind. 
Single engine in-flight shutdown  
ETOPS regulations define performance requirements for any 
aircraft flying long distance routes or beyond certain distances 
from a suitable airport. The FAA ETOPS requirements are 
summarised in [9], with the equivalent EASA requirements 
published within [12]. Both sets of standards are primarily 
concerned with the operation of twin engine aircraft and 
stipulate performance requirements of the remaining healthy 
engine following the failure of the other engine. Approval for 
ETOPS is based on the time within which a second engine 
failure would be extremely remote, where the time relates to 
the flight time to the nearest suitable airport with the aircraft 
travelling at a single engine speed. 
These regulations can influence an electrical architecture in 
two main ways: the provision of backup electrical supplies and 
the engine in-flight shutdown (IFSD) rate. The relevant 
sections from the regulations are discussed below. 
ETOPS electrical system requirements 
The following relevant ETOPS electrical system requirements 
are derived from [9] (Chapter II, section 7). Note that 
paragraph numbers have been retained for ease of cross 
referencing with [9]. These requirements are: 
(6) During extended duration single-engine operation, the 
remaining secondary power (electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic) 
will continue to be available at levels necessary to permit 
continued safe flight and landing.  
(7) In the event of any single failure, or any combination of 
failures not considered Extremely Improbable, electrical power 
should be provided for essential flight instruments, warning 
systems, avionics, communications, navigation, required route 
or destination guidance equipment, supportive systems and/or 
hardware as well as any other equipment deemed necessary 
to continue safe flight and landing at an ETOPS en-route 
alternate aerodrome. Information provided to the flight crew 
should also be of sufficient accuracy for the intended operation 
(typical functions are described in [9]).  
(8) Three or more reliable and independent electrical power 
sources should be available. As a minimum, following failure of 
any two sources, the remaining source should be capable of 
powering the items specified above [in (7)].  When one of the 3 
independent electrical power sources is time-limited (e.g. 
batteries), this power source should have a capability to 
provide sufficient power for the items listed above for continued 
flight and landing to an ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. 
(9) For ETOPS approvals above 180 minutes, the following 
additional requirements exist: 
1. Unless it can be shown that the failure of all 3 independent 
power sources required by paragraph (8) above is 
extremely improbable, following failure of these 3 
independent power sources, a fourth independent power 
source should be available that is capable of providing 
power to the essential functions referred to in paragraph 
(7) for continued safe flight and landing to an adequate 
ETOPS en-route alternate aerodrome. 
Depending on the criticality of engine accessories, these 
requirements may impact the necessary level supply path 
redundancy. 
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ETOPS engine IFSD rates 
Both [9] and [12] provide examples of the average IFSD rate 
which engines on a twin engine aircraft should achieve in order 
to meet certain ETOPS authorisation levels. The clearest 
definition (in the opinion of the authors) for the different ranges 
of applications is provided by EASA [9] (although the FAA and 
EASA guidance is generally consistent). These various levels 
are summarised below within Figure 2 and Figure 3.  
 
Figure 2. EASA derived ETOPS curve for IFSD rates against diversion 
time for diversions of less than 180 minutes [9]  
 
 
Figure 3. EASA derived ETOPS curve for IFSD rates against diversion 
time for diversions above 180 minutes [9]  
 
Interpreting the above per engine IFSD rates from EASA; 
these are generally derived from two main influencing factors: 
the target reliability for twin engine failure and the diversion 
time to a safe landing area. The relationship between these 
factors can be simply represented as 
ܫܨܵܦݎܽݐ݁ ൌ ට௢௩௘௥௔௟௟௣௥௢௕௔௕௜௟௜௧௬௧௔௥௚௘௧஽௜௩௘௥௦௜௢௡௧௜௠௘       (1) 
Within (1), the overall reliability target will be around a 
probability of 1×10-9 failures per flight hour ± this being the 
maximum probability for the occurrence of any catastrophic 
failures (although this target appears to vary at different points  
- for example two different targets are provided for the 3 hour 
diversion within Figure 2 and Figure 3). Within Figure 3, for 10 
hours diversion time to be acceptable the overall probability 
target is equal to 1×10-10 failures per flight hour (i.e. a rate of 
1×10-10 failures per flight hour for 10 hours). A plot based on 
(1) (ZKLFK LV WKH DXWKRUV¶ VLPSOLILFDWLRQ RI WKH ,)6' UDWH
calculation) with an overall target of 1×10-9 failures per flight 
hour is shown in Figure 4 for reference. Note that the resultant 
IFSD rate is lower (for the shorter diversion times at least) than 
the EASA plot in Figure 2 highlighting that this overall target 
can be higher than 1×10-9 failures per flight hour. 
The impact of these various failure rates will be to place 
different requirements on the engine reliability, and hence on 
the components responsible for maintaining continued engine 
operation. 
 
Figure 4. Example IFSD rate based on equation (1) with a twin engine 
failure target of 1×10-9 
 
Summary of requirements for prevention of engine IFSD 
The above sections have shown that there is some variability 
in the allowed IFSD rate of engines, with this mainly depending 
on the whether ETOPS certification is required and if so, the 
GHVLUDEOHµGLYHUVLRQWLPH¶RIWKHJLYHQDLUFUDIW 
CS-E classes engine failure (provided no additional external 
issues occur) as a minor engine effect and so on this basis its 
allowed failure rate ranges anywhere between 1×10-3 to 1×10-5 
failures per flight hour. Bringing in the requirements for ETOPS 
from Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 narrows this range to 
3.9×10-5 to 1×10-5 failures per flight hour, depending on 
required diversion time. This is this allowed failure rate of the 
overall engine system inclusive of the combined failure rate of 
relevant electrical components along with all other engine 
components which would contribute to an engine failure. 
To determine the impact this has on the engine electrical 
system and its components requires two main steps: 
1. A qualitative failure analysis of the electrical system to 
assess which fault types will cause an engine IFSD to 
enable the allowed probability of these occurring to be 
assessed and quantified. 
2. A quantitative failure analysis of the non-electrical engine 
parts which could result in an engine shutdown to enable 
the allowed electrical system failure rate to be determined. 
In the absence of the information in which to carry out step 2 
above, an alternative approachRU³UXOHRIWKXPE´ could be to 
design the electrical system such that the probability of failures 
in step 1 are insignificant compared to the overall engine 
failure rate (by say an order of magnitude). 
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The review of the standards did not present clear guidance on 
the need for redundant supply paths for engine accessory 
loads, with specific reference only being made to loads such as 
flight instruments and avionics. However some provision is 
made for additional flight critical equipment where the 
VWDQGDUGV VWDWH µany other equipment deemed necessary to 
continue safe flight¶ 7Kerefore a judgement will need to be 
made as to whether, following the failure of one engine, 
electrical engine loads critical to its ongoing operation would 
come into this category. It worth noting that in either case it 
may be challenging to achieve the quantitative reliability 
requirement with a single channel electrical supply. 
Engine control system failure  
The main means of engine control is provided by the Electric 
Engine Control System (EECS). Therefore much of the 
certification standards on engine control relate to the operation 
of this system. One failure mode which the standards make 
specific provision for is loss of thrust/loss of power control 
(LOTC/LOPC). Reference [13] defines LOTC/LOPC (hereafter 
just referred to as LOTC) event as either: 
x The loss of ability to modulate power or thrust from idle to 
90% maximum rated power or thrust at given flight 
condition or 
x The oscillation of engine thrust in an unacceptable manor 
Reference [13] and AMC E 1030 within CS-E [7] state that 
these events should not on average (although the 
instantaneous rate can be temporary higher as discussed in 
the following section) occur at a greater rate than 10 in every 
million flight hours (1×10-5 failures/flight hour) or an alternative 
appropriate rate for the given application. Whilst LOTC is not 
GLUHFWO\ UHIHUUHG WR ZLWKLQ WKH DERYH H[DPSOHV RI µ(QJLQH
(IIHFWV¶ WKH DERYH IDLOXUH UDWH and the reference to 
µunacceptable thrust oscillation¶ would suggest that it is a 
µ0DMRU(QJLQH(IIHFW¶. 
As the engine thrust is controlled via the EECS and it is this 
system (and its electrical supply) which should ensure these 
conditions are met. This is reflected in CS-E where all 
statements which refer to the prevention of LOTC relate to the 
performance and reliability of the EECS. 
In addition to the quantified failure rate for EECS (with respect 
to LOTC), prescriptive statements are made within [13] 
regarding the requirement for redundant channels in the EECS 
regardless of the failure rate of any single channel. Those 
UHOHYDQW VWDWHPHQWV DQG WKHLU SRWHQWLDO LPSDFW RQ D V\VWHP¶V
architecture are discussed below. 
CS-E 50 (c) Engine Control System Failures. The Engine 
Control System must be designed and constructed so that: 
(1) The rate for Loss of Thrust (or Power) Control 
(LOTC/LOPC) events, consistent with the safety objective 
associated with the intended aircraft application, can be 
achieved. 
(2) In the Full-up Configuration (i.e. the system without any 
faults present), the system is essentially single fault tolerant for 
electrical and electronic failures with respect to LOTC/LOPC 
events. 
(3) Single Failures of Engine Control System components do 
not result in a Hazardous Engine Effect. 
CS-E 50 (h) Aircraft Supplied Electrical Power 
(1) The Engine Control System must be designed so that the 
loss or interruption of electrical power supplied from the aircraft 
to the Engine Control System will not: 
(i) Result in a Hazardous Engine Effect. 
(ii) Cause the unacceptable transmission of erroneous data. 
The effect of the loss or interruption of aircraft supplied 
electrical power must be taken into account in complying with 
CS-E 50 (c)(1). 
Two key messages can be taken from the above statements: 
1. Dual redundancy as a minimum is required in the 
EECS itself 
2. Dual redundancy as a minimum is required in the 
supply of electrical power to the EECS 
Whilst this redundancy is critical to meeting overall reliability 
standards, the multiple channels can actually increase the 
probability of a single failure occurring (although not one which 
would interrupt the operation of the EECS). In order to prevent 
an increase in system downtime and maintenance, the EECS 
can be dispatched with an existing fault for a limited period of 
time [14]. The approach to managing this dispatch is described 
in the following section. 
Management of control system faults through time limited 
dispatch 
Time limited dispatch (TLD) describes an operating philosophy 
whereby aircraft are allowed to dispatch with faults present for 
a set period of time [14]. Within CS-E, specific reference is 
made to the EECS and the use of the redundancy present 
within these systems to continue aircraft operation (albeit with 
reduced levels of redundancy) for a limited period of time whilst 
still meeting appropriate reliability targets.  
CS-(  D VWDWHV WKDW ³if approval is sought for dispatch 
with Faults present in an Electronic Engine Control System 
(EECS), a time limited dispatch (TLD) analysis of the EECS 
must be carried out to determine the dispatch and 
maintenance intervals´,QSDUWLFXODUWKHV\VWHPDUFKLWHFWPXVW
consider all fault types to assess whether the system is 
capable of meeting certain design criteria with that fault 
present. As well as continuing to meet all the usual functional 
requirements of the engine operation, the additional rules 
which apply to systems which would be dispatched with faults 
present include: 
CS-E 1030 (b) For each dispatchable configuration it must be 
shown by test or analysis that a further single failure in the 
EECS will not produce a Hazardous Engine Effect. 
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CS-E 1030 (c) The time-weighted-average of the Full-up 
Configuration and all allowable dispatch configurations with 
faults, must meet the Loss of Thrust Control / Loss of Power 
Control (LOTC/LOPC) rate for the intended application(s). 
These rules present new requirements for the engine: 
1. An additional layer of redundancy over and above that 
provided to meet failure and LOTC requirements may be 
required to meet TLD conditions. 
2. Following a single failure, the remaining healthy portion of 
the engine systems must be able to meet a dedicated TLD 
probability requirement. 
AMC E 1030 provides further guidance to help quantify some 
of the additional design constraints. First it describes four 
general categories to describe a faulted or degraded system 
with respect to dispatch. These categories are: 
(a) No Dispatch. Configurations that do not comply with CS-
E 1030 (b) and/or (c) or do not qualify for another category 
should be categorised as No Dispatch. 
(b) Short Time Dispatch. Configurations that comply with 
CS-E 1030 (b) and/or (c) and satisfy the following 
condition should be categorised as Short Time Dispatch: 
the computed LOTC/LOPC rate with the Fault(s) present 
is less than or equal to an upper limit that has been set at 
10 times the fleet-wide average reliability criteria or 
³DYHUDJH /27&/23& UDWH´ IRU WKH LQVWDOODWLRQ 7KH
LOTC/LOPC rates for different installations may be found 
in AMC 20-3.) However, even if the Long Time Dispatch 
LOTC/LOPC rate is met, configurations where the EECS 
has reverted to essentially single channel operation or has 
lost a significant degree of redundancy should be 
categorised as Short Time Dispatch. 
(c) Long Time Dispatch. Configurations that comply with 
CS-E 1030 (b) and/or (c) and satisfy the following 
condition should be categorised as Long Time Dispatch: 
the computed LOTC/LOPC rate with the Fault(s) present 
is less than or equal to 75 percent of an upper limit that 
has been set at 10 times the fleet-wide average reliability 
FULWHULDRU ³DYHUDJH/27&/23& UDWH´ IRU WKH LQVWDOODWLRQ
(The LOTC/LOPC rates for different installations may be 
found in AMC 20-3.) 
(d) Applicant defined dispatch. This category is for faults 
that do not have an impact on the LOTC/LOPC rate. 
Information is also given on the acceptable length of time 
which these various fault types may be present on a system. 
This is shown in Table 2. These repair times give an 
impression of allowable maintenance periods following any 
system failure. Guidance on how these times impact the 
required reliability of system components within a 
µGLVSDWFKDEOH¶V\VWHPZLWK UHVSHFW WR/27& LVSURYLGHG within 
AMC E 1030 section (4) on Time Limited Dispatch Analysis. 
Alternatively, part (b) above states that the maximum LOTC 
rate for the dispatched system is 10 times the fleet-wide 
average. For the example figures given, the maximum 
µLQVWDQWDQHRXV¶DVLW called in [14]) LOTC rate is therefore 100 
events per million flight hours. 
Table 2. An Example of Operating Times for TLD Operations [7] 
Experience 
Level 
No dispatch 
category 
Short time faults 
(max operating 
time) 
Long-time fault 
category ± max 
operating time 
Entry Level No Flight Allowed 125 Engine flight hours. 
250 Engine flight 
hours.  
Mature 
Level No Flight Allowed 
Depends on 
system analysis 
Depends on 
system analysis 
 
Finally, AMC E 1030 provides a simplified decision making 
process to give guidance on how various system fault types 
may be dealt with. This is presented in Figure 5. Note that the 
Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) is the collective 
equipment required for take-off.  
Figure 5. Different possible ways of managing dispatch with engine 
faults [7]  
Within Figure 5 it can be seen that all initial EECS faults are 
considered to cause a loss of redundancy rather than any 
performance degradation. This is the key factor will enables 
the system to continue to operate correctly and safely with 
faults present. For TLD to be applied to anything other than the 
EECS then, similar levels of redundancy must be available.  
Summary of requirements for the prevention of engine 
control system failure 
The need to prevent LOTC events places requirements on the 
EECS load and its electrical supply. These requirements are 
both qualitative (in terms of required layers of redundancy) and 
quantitative (in terms of prescribed failure rates under different 
conditions). 
The main quantitative certification requirement is that LOTC 
events should on average occur at a rate no greater than 10 in 
every million flight hours (although there is some scope for this 
to change based on the application as discussed in [15]). 
Therefore any failure mode of the EECS which causes this to 
occur must have a probability of this or lower for normal 
system design. This design specification is referred to as the 
time weighted average rate, which allows some scope for 
temporarily greater LOTC event rate which is a maximum of 10 
times the average LOTC rate, which is 100 events per million 
flight hours for the general allowed LOTC rate. This higher rate 
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would occur under TLD operation and all dispatchable 
configurations would be required to meet this specification. 
The failure rate of the electrical supply to the EECS would also 
need to meet this requirement to ensure continued availability 
of this system. Therefore it can be derived that the EECS 
electrical supply should have an average failure rate of no 
greater than 1×10-5 failures/flight hour. As the failure of the 
EECS load itself would also need to be accommodated within 
this rate, it is reasonable to assume that the failure rate of the 
electrical supply would have to be even lower. 
In terms of qualitative design requirements, single fault 
WROHUDQFHLVUHTXLUHGLQWKHµIXOO-XSFRQILJXUDWLRQ¶+RZHYHUWKLV
is not a stipulation for TLD. Instead any single channel 
RSHUDWLRQ ZRXOG EH SODFHG LQ WKH µVKRUW-WHUP GLVSDWFKUHSDLU¶
category, which for entry level systems is 125 hours. This 
single channel would also be required to match the 
instantaneous LOTC event rate which is a maximum of 100 
events per million flight hours. 
Electrical supply options to achieve these design objectives 
can vary with application as discussed in [15]. These include 
the use of dedicated engine power sources for EECS, aircraft 
supplied power (or at least engine power sources also 
connected to the aircraft) or a combination of both options. 
Outstanding questions on the certification of 
MEE electrical systems  
It is clear from the reviews in the previous sections that, with 
the exception of the EECS supply, direct information regarding 
the required failure rate of the engine electrical system is not 
explicitly provided within the certification standard. This puts an 
onus on the architecture designer to infer requirements from 
the more general functional specifications. As discussed 
previously, this requires a full failure analysis of the engine 
electrical system to ensure all failure modes are accounted for. 
Furthermore, the optimal means of managing these electrical 
system faults (from an aircraft dispatch perspective) requires 
investigation. CS-E provides 3 general options (as shown in 
Figure 5) for this and these are: 
1. No dispatch  
2. Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) ± where all 
equipment required for take-off must be functional 
3. Time limited dispatch ± as described for EECS systems 
Within this list, AMC 1030 suggests that the MMEL approach 
should be taken for anything other than EECS faults. However, 
in a similar way to that of the EECS, there may be an 
opportunity to maximise the availability of the electrical system 
and make best use of redundant supply paths through a TLD 
type operating approach. This would also provide guidance on 
the duration which failure electrical equipment is allowed to 
remain on the engine before maintenance is requirement. More 
specifically, provided there is no impact on the LOTC rate, 
VRPH µ$SSOLFDQW GHILQHG GLVSDWFK¶ WLPH LQWHUYDOV FRXOG EH
defined by the systems integrator in terms of maintenance 
scheduling for the electrical system. 
The following section provides examples of how a degraded 
electrical system might compare to certification requirements. 
Comparison of example MEE architecture with 
derived reliability requirements 
In order to assess the compliance of a MEE electrical system 
architecture with the above requirements, it is necessary to 
carry out a reliability study of the architecture being 
considered. An example of how this can be carried out will be 
presented within this section. The analysis will also consider 
some degraded architectures, where certain supply routes are 
inoperable, in order to establish the feasibility of any TLD 
operation of the electrical system. 
The outline electrical architecture to which this analysis will be 
applied is shown in Figure 6. This architecture contains two 
generators, which supply both the airframe and the engine 
accessory loads (supplying independent channels within each). 
Two loads (L1 and L2) are considered for the purpose of this 
analysis. It is assumed that both of these loads are critical to 
the continued operation of the engine (an electrical engine fuel 
pump for example) and the failure of these loads, or the 
electrical supply to them, would cause an IFSD event. Each 
load has two supply routes (S2 and S3 for L1, S1 and S4 for L2) 
via the two intermediate busbars (Bus1 and Bus2) and bus-tie 
contactor (BT1). Finally, it is assumed that each load would 
require its own custom AC power supply and therefore to 
provide this, power converters would need to be integrated into 
this architecture at appropriate locations (also accommodating 
the needs of the airframe). Different conversion options are 
discussed within a later section.  
 
Figure 6. Outline MEE electrical system architecture  
Reliability analysis of full-up electrical architecture  
Analysing a network with multiple but dependent backup paths 
such as that in Figure 6 this can be complex, particular when 
accommodating the large number of potential failure events. 
To analyse these failure conditions, this section will employ 
fault tree analysis and will apply Boolean reduction to simplify 
the developed equations describing the main failure modes of 
the architecture. These techniques for fault analysis are 
described within [16]. More specifically, the application of 
%RROHDQUHGXFWLRQDOORZVWKHµPLQLPal FXWVHW¶WREHGHWHUPLQHG
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± this being the minimum number of individual failures which 
must occur in order to cause the event of interest. 
The purpose of the examples within this section is to illustrate 
the methodology for analysing electrical networks. Therefore to 
simplify this illustration, contactor failures (except from the bus 
tie contactor) and cable failures have been excluded. Note 
these should however be considered at a later stage for an 
entirely accurate calculation of failure rate. Applying this 
analysis to the architecture in Figure 6 to the failure of the fuel 
pump supply initially gives a minimal cut set of  ܲሺܮଵሻ ൌ ܩଵǤ ܩଶ ൅ ܤݑݏଵǤ ܤݑݏଶ ൅ ܵଶǤ ܵଷ                (2) 
Probability of failure to where all terms refer the failure rate of 
the components labelled in Figure 6 and G1 and G2 include the 
failure rate of the associated generator control unit and/or 
power electronic interface. From (2) a fault tree can be drawn 
and this is shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Simplified fault tree for the failure of electrical supply to L1 
A similar fault tree can be drawn for L2, with the substitution of 
supply paths as appropriate. Finally, an equation for the rate of 
either of these events occurring can be developed, which for 
the purpose of this analysis would also cause an engine IFSD 
event. This equation is  ܲሺܮଵ݋ݎܮଶሻ ൌ ܩଵǤ ܩଶ ൅ ܤݑݏଵǤ ܤݑݏଶ ൅ ܵଶǤ ܵଷ ൅ ܵଵǤ ܵସǤ            (3) 
The fault tree based on (3) is shown in Figure 12. Later 
sections demonstrate how these fault tree and/or equations 
can be used to compare the network failure rate with the 
certification requirements. 
 
Figure 8. Simplified fault tree for the failure electrical supply to L1 or L2 
Reliability analysis of degraded electrical 
architectures 
The following two sections provide analysis to describe how 
the calculations for a fuel or oil pump electrical supply failure 
vary with certain supply path inoperable. These cases will 
highlight changes in system reliability under possible time 
limited dispatch scenarios. 
Single inoperable supply path - dispatch scenario 1 
The first dispatch scenario which has been analysed is, as 
illustrated in Figure 9, the failure of one of the redundant 
supply path, S1. 
 
Figure 9. Outline MEE electrical system architecture with one supply 
path inoperable (dispatch scenario 1) 
The equation to describe the probability of supply failure in this 
new configuration can be developed by simply removing the S1 
term from (3). This equation becomes ܲሺܮଵ݋ݎܮଶሻ ൌ ܩଵǤ ܩଶ ൅ ܤݑݏଵǤ ܤݑݏଶ ൅ ܵସ ൅ ܵଶǤ ܵଷ       (4) 
The fault tree based on (4) is shown in Figure 10. Note that the 
removal of S1 means that it no longer multiplies the parallel 
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path of S4, which in turn is likely to increase the overall failure 
rate. 
 
Figure 10. Simplified fault tree for the failure electrical supply to either 
L1 or L2 with supply path S1 inoperable 
Two inoperable supply paths - dispatch scenario 2 
The second dispatch configuration considered looks at further 
degradation of the architecture, with both supply paths S1 and 
S2 inoperable. This configuration is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Outline MEE electrical system architecture with two supply 
paths inoperable (dispatch scenario 2) 
Similarly to the previous case, the equation for the supply 
failure in this configuration can be developed by removing 
terms S1 and S2 from (3). This equation becomes  ܲሺܮଵ݋ݎܮଶሻ ൌ ܩଵǤ ܩଶ ൅ ܤݑݏଵǤ ܤݑݏଶ ൅ ܵଷ ൅ ܵସ       (5) 
The fault tree based on (5) is shown in Figure 12. The figure 
highlights that the removal of both S1 and S2 now means that 
the failure rates of S3 and S4 now sum to increase the overall 
failure rate. 
 
Figure 12. Simplified fault tree for the failure electrical supply to L1 or 
L2 with supply paths S1 and S2 inoperable  
Application of example failure rate data and 
comparison with requirements 
To enable a comparison to be made between the derived 
electrical system requirements and the architectures analysed 
previously, this section will define the components within the 
architectures and apply example failure probability data to the 
fault tree equations.  
Two configurations of the general architecture from Figure 6 
will be considered. Configuration 1 is a central conversion 
architecture, where Bus1 and Bus2 represent rectifier stages on 
to a DC bus and S1-4 represent inverter stages, each providing 
a custom AC supply to the connected load. Configuration 2 is a 
more localised conversion strategy where Bus1,2 are AC 
distribution busbars and S1-4 represent back to back rectifier-
inverters, again providing a custom AC supply to the loads. 
The full up and degraded conditions are assessed for each 
configuration. 
The representative failure probability data used to analyse the 
architectures is shown in Table 3. This data is derived from a 
range of sources, as indicated by the references within the 
table. These have been applied to equations (2) to (5) in order 
to estimate the probability of the failure events, enabling a 
comparison with requirements. The data is applied differently 
for the two architecture configurations. For Configuration 1: 
G1,2 are the sum of the generator and GCU failure rates, Bus1,2 
are equal to the rate of a rectifier or inverter failure (with a 
rectifier stage here) and lines S1-4 are also equal to the rate of 
a rectifier or inverter failure (with the inverter stage here). For 
Configuration 2: G1,2 are the same as above, Bus1,2 are equal 
to the rate of the conductor failure and lines S1-4 are equal to 
the rate of a rectifier or inverter failure squared (with both the 
rectifier and inverter stages now on this line). Note that AC and 
DC contactors are included in this table to accommodate either 
an AC or DC bus tie. Results are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Summary of applied component failure rate data 
Component type Failure Rate (failures per 
flight hour) 
Wound field generator 5 x10-4        [17] 
Generator control unit (GCU) 2 x10-4        [17] 
Rectifier/Inverter 2 x10-5        [18] 
AC contactor 2.30x10-5     [19] 
DC contactor 1.53x10-5       [19] 
Conductor 1.01x10-6     [20] 
 
Table 4. Summary of failure rates for full up and degraded electrical 
architectures 
Architecture 
configuration 
Architecture 
condition Failure event 
Probability of failure 
(failures per flight hour) 
1 
Full up 
L1 supply 4.908×10-7 
L1 or L2 (leading 
to engine IFSD) 4.912×10
-7
 
Dispatch 
Scenario 1 
L1 or L2 (leading 
to engine IFSD) 2.05×10
-5
 
Dispatch 
Scenario 2 
L1 or L2 (leading 
to engine IFSD) 4.05×10
-5
 
2 
Full up 
L1 supply 4.916×10-7 
L1 or L2 (leading 
to engine IFSD) 4.932×10
-7
 
Dispatch 
Scenario 1 
L1 or L2 (leading 
to engine IFSD) 4.05×10
-5
 
Dispatch 
Scenario 2 
L1 or L2 (leading 
to engine IFSD) 8.05×10
-5
 
 
The results in Table 4 highlight that the rate of occurrence of a 
particular failure event tends to be dominated by one or two 
individual components (note that this has been calculated per 
flight hour and so would need to be adjusted to determine the 
likelihood of a failure occurring for longer flight times). For the 
full up condition for both configurations, the table shows that 
the engine IFSD rate is very similar to the L1 supply failure rate 
despite containing a number of additional terms in the failure 
equation. In this case the overall failure rate is dominated by 
the combined rate for failure of the two generators. Within the 
WZR µGLVSDWFK¶ FDVHV IDLOXUH UDWH EHFRPHV GRPLQDWHG E\ WKH
probability of the single converter or converters supplying the 
engine accessories. The failure rate of Configuration 2 almost 
doubles compared to Configuration 1 as it has two converters 
connected in series to the load input, again highlighting the 
dominance of the converters in determining this failure rate. 
Therefore it is clear from this that the results of this analysis 
DUHYHU\VHQVLWLYHWRWKHVHFRPSRQHQWV¶IDLOXUHUDWH 
Table 5. Estimated allowed failure rate of electrical system for full up 
and degraded electrical architectures to prevent IFSD with various 
diversion time 
Architecture condition 
Estimated allowed failure rate of electrical 
system (failures per flight hour) with 
ETOPS diversion requirement of: 
1 hour  5 hours 10 hours 
Full up 1×10-5 5×10-6 1×10-6 
Time limited dispatch 
(assuming 10 times 
greater than full up) 
1×10-4 5×10-5 1×10-5 
 
Comparing these rates to the requirements derived in earlier 
sections (the estimations of electrical system requirements 
assuming an failure rate which is an order of magnitude below 
the overall requirement are shown again in Table 5), and in 
particular the IFSD rate required for ETOPS certification, 
reveals some interesting findings. These include: 
x In the full up condition of each configuration, the failure 
rate is almost two orders of magnitude below the 
maximum permitted IFSD rate and so electrical supply 
failures (even incorporating cable and contactor failures) 
should not have any impact on this rate (and there may be 
some scope for reduction in redundancy). 
x In the degraded states, the failure rate is similar to that of 
the normal IFSD rate of the engine. Therefore the potential 
for loss of electrical supply to the engine accessories will 
have a significant impact on WKH RYHUDOO HQJLQH¶V ,)6' 
rate. 
x If the allowed engine IFSD is temporarily increased 
following a single failure in the electrical system (the 
assumed temporarily increased rate for TLD conditions is 
shown in in Table 5) then the current results show 
compliance with the derived requirements. 
The second and third points highlight that if it was desirable to 
dispatch the aircraft with known failures on the engine 
electrical system (as is very likely to be the case) then careful 
consideration would have to be given to how this impacts 
ETOPS certification. No clear guidance was found on the 
application of the TLD to electrical systems with regard to 
ETOPS within the standards. However some relevant 
questions for this purpose are: 
x Can ETOPS certification targets still be met with one 
healthy engine and one engine with a degraded electrical 
system?  
- Can the failure of both engines still be considered 
as extremely remote ZKHQRQHHQJLQH¶VHOHFWULFDO
system is in a degraded state? 
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- Or do ETOPS regulations require the IFSD rate 
of individual engines to be a certain level (worst 
case scenario in this case being a failure of one 
engine with the other having been dispatched 
with an electrical system in a degraded state)? 
x ShRXOG WKH DOORZHG µGLYHUVLRQ WLPH¶ EH VKRUWened for 
specific flights in order to comply with regulations while an 
HQJLQH¶VHOHFWULFDOV\VWHPLVin a degraded state and what 
would the impact of this be on aircraft availability for all 
intended routes? 
x Should the allowed IFSD rate be increased on one engine 
on a time-limited basis (such as the 10 fold increase in the 
allowed LOTC rate) for non-EECS related failures? 
Addressing these points will enable the suitability of different 
architectures and operating approaches to be determined with 
far more assurance. 
Conclusions 
The interpretation of relevant certification standards is a critical 
step LQ GHILQLQJ D V\VWHP¶V GHsign requirements. This paper 
has outlined a review of engine certification standards, with key 
redundancy and reliability requirements for normal operation, 
Time Limited Dispatch (TLD) and Extended Range Twin 
Operation (ETOPS) being defined. Comparison of MEE 
architectures with these defined requirements helps to both 
assess DQDUFKLWHFWXUH¶V compliance with standards as well as 
determine the necessary reliability of certain supply paths or 
components.  
The paper also identifies that the optimal means of managing 
electrical system faults (from an aircraft dispatch perspective) 
requires investigation. In particular, it is highlighted that there 
may be an opportunity to maximise the availability of the 
electrical system and make best use of redundant supply paths 
through a TLD type operating approach. Exploration of such 
operating approaches is important in ensuring maintainability 
targets are met and unnecessary downtime is minimised within 
future more-electric platforms. 
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